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JUSTICE SCALIA, POVERTY
AND THE GOOD SOCIETY
Toby Golick*
Why do we care about Justice Scalia's view of the good society,
given his limited view of the role of the courts as "not inquisitors of
justice but arbiters of adversary claims"?' Maybe Justice Scalia
thinks we already have a "good society," or at least a good enough
society, and that as a result, the courts have only the classic conserva
tive role of keeping things as they are. But judges make decisions and
decisions change things at least a little; the changes may be steps for
ward or backward, and when a Supreme Court Justice is taking the
steps, it is important enough to worry about. In addition, when a
judge is not entirely predictable, his view of society may be interesting
enough to justify further analysis. Also, judges like Scalia who have a
reputation for not only being smart, but dso "intellectual," are partic
ularly interesting for scholars and lawyers, who hope despite all evi
dence to the contrary that someone "intellectual" will also be "fairminded."^
Justice Scalia's opinions in cases involving government benefits
for the poor provide some clues about his view of the good society.
From these opinions we leam that in the good society, the poor had
better not look to the courts for help. In virtually every case involv
ing government benefits. Justice Scalia votes to defeat the claims of
public assistance recipients.^ This paper examines several of Justice
* Clinical Professor and Director, Bet Tzedek Legal Sevices, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law. A.B., 1966, Barnard College, J.D., 1969, Columbia University.
t Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Q. 482 (1989).
2 I have misstated this proposition somewhat. A practicing lawyer wants a fair judge only
if that is the only way to win the case.
3 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) (sustaining regulation denying needy
children the benefit of a $50 disregard for "child support" if they received Social Security
benefits); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (uphol^ng policy requiring that income of all
family members in same household be considered, even though this burdened right to live
together); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (sustaining statute denying food
stamps to strikers); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding restrictive Social Secur
ity disability regulations); Mullins Coal v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Pro
grams, 484 U.S. 135 (1987) (upholding Labor Department regulations making it more difficult
for miners to get black lung benefits); Cardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988) (holding that
welfare recipients are not entitled to individualized notice before their benefits were terminated
as a result of the lump sum rule); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (social security
recipient whose benefits were illegally terminated has no remedy in tort for money damages).
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Scalia's opinions to try to understand why he is so resistant to the
claims of the poor.
I.

SCALIA'S VIEW OF CHALLENGES BY WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO
PUBLIC BENEFIT REGULATIONS

We should put Justice Scalia's insensitivity to the poor in con
text. Even in the good old days (to poverty lawyers, at least) of the
Warren court, when lawyers for the poor spent hours strategizing
about how to get to the Supreme Court as quickly as possible,^ the
Court was never willing to recognize a basic right to food and shelter
comparable to the basic right to, say, erect a billboard proclaiming
that one is hungry.' Now, in a much more conservative era, poverty
lawyers have largely abandoned generalizations about the right to life
(the real "right to life" which means a right to a decent level of subsis
tence®) and have turned to subsections of the subsections of statutes to
try to squeeze out a few more dollars for the poor.^ Lawyers for the
poor used to feel like revolutionaries articulating new social philoso
phies; now—searching for loopholes in restrictive statutes—we feel
like the tax lawyers for the poor.
Lukhard v. Reed^ is an example of the eflForts by lawyers for the
poor to find exemptions to ameliorate the hardship of unfair pubhc
^ We especially loved three-judge courts under the former version of 28 U.S.C. § 2281,
repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381 § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, and the current 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1988) (permitting direct appeals to the Supreme Court) and we tried hard to
get them convened. A lot of important welfare cases came before the Supreme Court on ap
peal from the three-judge courts. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating
welfare regulations disqualifying needy children based on a "man in the house"); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residency requirements for public
assistance.) Now we prefer any strategy that avoids the Supreme Court.
5 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) held that a regulation providing ceilings on
welfare grants, regardless of family size, does not violate equal protection or Social Security
Act and signalled the limits of the Supreme Court's willingness to read the Constitution expan
sively to ^leviate problems of poverty. And after the euphoria of our numerous victories
before the Court wore oflF, lawyers for the poor were faced with the reality that (despite the
ringing rhetoric in some of the decisions), most of the victories were based on statutory inter
pretations or on due process requirements for fair procedures, rather than fair amounts of
benefits. See, e.g.. King, 392 U.S. at 309; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The good
news is that one does not lose one's welfare benefits without a hearing. The bad news is that
welfare benefits are not enough to live on.
6 The term "right to life" was originally used by poverty lawyers in the 1960s to refer to a
right to have at least adequate income to sustain life decently. The term, abandoned to the
antiabortion forces, now refers only to the right of a fetus to be carried to term and bom, with
no particular guarantee about life afterwards.
' Lawyers for the poor are sticking to the state courts when trying to achieve an adequate
standard of life for the poor. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 554 N.Y.S.2d 92,
553 N.E. 2d 570, (1990) (recognizing right to adequate shelter allowance).
8 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
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assistance regulations. The issue in this case was whether a personal
injury award to a public assistance recipient should be treated as "in
come" or as a "resource." Not surprisingly, for many years no one—
including public assistance recipients who had received personal in
jury awards—cared about this question. Whether a personal injury
award was characterized as income or resource, the rule was that the
recipient became ineligible for public assistance for as long as she had
the extra money.
The issue of whether a monetary award should be treated as "in
come" or "resource" suddenly became important in 1981 when Con
gress enacted an extraordinarily harsh series of laws restricting
government welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Depen
dent Children (AFDC) program. One of the meanest of these provi
sions was the so-called lump sum rule, designed to prevent welfare
recipients who receive an amount of money exceeding the state's
monthly income eligibility limit from spending it right away in order
to quahfy again for public assistance. Under the lump sum rule, a
welfare recipient who receives an amount of income exceeding the
"standard of need" (the minimum subsistence level on which welfare
benefits are based) is ineligible for as many months as that income
would last if the recipient were to spend only an amount equal to the
state's standard of need each month.
The lump sum statute was generated by the fantasy of a welfare
recipient, perhaps the hated welfare queen, somehow coming into
thousands of dollars—^the lump sum at the end of the rainbow—^and
spending it all in one month of high living, instead of sticking to a
budget hke a "responsible" adult. Given that the "standard of need"
is pitifully small even in the most generous states, the reality is that
most welfare recipients lucky enough to come into some extra money
cannot make it last for the period specified in the lump sum formula.
So if the long lost uncle of a welfare recipient dies and leaves her a few
thousand dollars in his will, then she will be worse oflF than she was
before—with no more money than if she was getting welfare, and with
a lot more trouble both in conserving the money for the required pe
riod and in dealing with the administrative headache of making sure
that benefits resume promptly when the lump sum runs out. The situ
ation of the individual who receives a personal injury award is even
worse; in that case the money is seldom just a lucky windfall unac
companied by hurt and pain and extra medical expenses.
In response to the lump sum rule, Virginia and some other states
(who participate in the AFDC program and must comply with federal
law in order to receive federal reimbursement for the program) re-
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vised their welfare regulations to treat personal injury awards
(although not proceeds from the sale or conversion of real or personal
property) as income, subject to the lump sum rule. Aflfiected welfare
recipients sued, claiming that treating personal injury awards as "in
come" was not permitted under federal law because personal injury
awards, being purely compensatory and not representing real gain or
profit to the recipients, are not income. In Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion in Lukhard v. Reed, the court rejected the welfare recipients'
claim by a five-to-four vote.'
I am persuaded by Professor Kannar's analysis'" that Justice
Scalia is not purely result-oriented, and does not start the process of
deciding a case with the view that poor people must always lose.
Rather, as Professor Kannar points out. Justice Scalia's results derive
from his methodology. Unfortunately however, given this methodol
ogy, poor people always lose. Let's watch Justice Scalia's methodol
ogy in action in Lukhard, the lump sum case described above.
First, Justice Scalia ignores the consequences of his decision on
the persons affected, who are barely mentioned in the opinion. (Com
pare Justice Powell's dissent, which describes the hardship of impov
erished plaintiffs who are forced to choose between using their
personal injury awards for medical care and providing for the basic
needs of their children.) Presumably, he ignores consequences be
cause he is rigorously not result-oriented; while sometimes this ap
proach might be beneficial (as Professor Kannar points out, not being
result-oriented will often help criminal defendants), it will seldom
help the poor who often need a bit of mercy as much or more than
they need rigorous readings of rules.
Second (or he would probably say "first"). Justice Scalia looks at
the "plain language" of the statutory provision at issue, which here
states that the lump sum rule applies to "income." At this point, the
welfare recipients lose the case, just as they will lose every case where
it is claimed that a regulation is inconsistent with a statute. Language
is almost always elastic enough (the "treachery and versatility of our
language")" to accommodate multiple meanings including the mean
ing claimed by the administrative agency. So of course even though
the term "income" usually does not include a personal injury award,
surely the word is broad enough to mean any money that comes in,
and so Justice Scalia finds.
Third, Justice Scalia rejects the welfare recipients' argument
9 Id.
'O Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
'1 See Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 352 (1960) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
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based on the administrative and legislative history of the AFDC pro
gram. There is a lot to say about the history and purpose of the
AFDC program, which is to protect needy families, and particularly
needy children. However, Justice Scalia ignores the question (the an
swer to which decided the case for Justice Powell, who wrote the dis
sent)'^ of whether a provision working such substantial hardship on
needy families suflfering personal injury could be consistent with a
congressional scheme to benefit needy families. Instead, Justice Scalia
concentrates his analysis on the microhistory of the administrative let
ters and directives issued by the federal agency.
Because Justice Scalia has frequently written skeptically about
how legislative and administrative history is made and why it is unre
liable, it is curious that he chooses to give credence to "history" as
counterfeit as that presented here. The "history" consists of recent
administrative rulings written by the conservative bureaucrats who
took over the agency after the election of Ronald Reagan. These ad
ministrative rulings, every one of which was written after the enact
ment of the lump sum rule, announce that there is "long-standing
precedent" for the states being able to treat personal injury awards as
income, but not a single older document demonstrates the validity of
the recent documents' version of history. Nor does the record show
that any state has ever availed itself of this "long-standing precedent."
Justice Scalia, suggesting that it is inappropriate "to speculate
upon what Congress would have said if it had spoken," rejects the
welfare recipients' arguments based on congressional intent: "the le
gality of Virginia's policy must be measured against the AFDC stat
ute Congress passed, not against the hypothetical statute it is most
'reasonable to believe' Congress would have passed had it considered
the question of personal injury awards.'"^ Justice Scalia's approach
to congressional intent knocks out the last pillar of the welfare recipi
ents' argument in this case and is an ominous portent to public assist
ance advocates in other cases. Public benefit programs are enacted
with generally benevolent purposes (or, at least, generally benevolent
purposes are announced), and lawyers for the poor rely on these in
tentions in their arguments that particular restrictive regulations vio
late this intent. If so little weight is accorded to the intent and context
of the statute, the welfare recipients challenging a restrictive regula
tion have little on which to base their arguments.
Justice Scalia next makes fun of the welfare recipients' argument
12 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 392 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice PoweH's dissenting opin
ion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor.
" Id. at 376 n.3.
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that the personal injury award should be treated as a resource because
the award compensates for damage to the "resource" of a healthy
body. Justice Scalia responds that "[sjince healthy bodies are worth
far more than the statute's $1,000 family resource limit... acceptance
of respondents' major premise would render every family ineligible for
AFDC benefits.'"'' If this is a joke, it is chilling. However it seems
not to be a joke because there is no further effort to respond to the
welfare recipients' argument on this point. But of course, acceptance
of the premise does not make all welfare recipients with healthy bod
ies ineligible until they sell enough body parts to deplete their re
source for the simple reason that certain resources of public assistance
recipients have never been counted in determining eligibility. The re
mark about healthy bodies, however, suggests that it is not just the
restrictions in Justice Scalia's methodology with which welfare recipi
ents must contend, but a degree of callousness as well.
Sullivan v. Everhart^^ is another example of the prevailing genre
of technical, statutory challenges to public benefits regulations—in
this case, challenges to the Social Security Administration rules and
regulations that govern overpayments and underpayments. Again,
Justice Scalia's methodology results in poor people losing the case.
The issue in the case, as described by Justice Scalia's majority
opinion, sounds dry and uninteresting:
If the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that a
beneficiary has received "more or less than the correct amount of
payment," the Social Security Act requires him to eflfect "proper
adjustment or recovery," subject to certain restrictions in the case
of overpayments. This case requires us to decide whether the Sec
retary's so-called "netting" regulations, under which he calculates
the difference between past underpayments and past overpayments,
are merely a permissible method of determining whether "more or
less than the correct amount of payment" was made, or are in
stead, as to netted-out overpayments, an "adjustment or recovery"
that must comply with procedures for recovery of overpayments
imposed by the Act.'®
And the hypothetical examples Justice Scalia uses to illustrate the
problem make it sound both uninteresting and unimportant. In real
ity, the problem of Social Security underpayments and overpayments
is, if not exactly fascinating, of tremendous importance to affected in
dividuals, almost all of whom are poor—a fact you would not leam
from reading Justice Scalia's opinion.
14 Id. at 381.
15 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
16 Id. at 962.
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Overpayments and underpayments occur frequently in the errorprone and complex world of Social Security benefit computations, and
often amount to thousands of dollars—huge sums for all recipients of
Supplemental Security Income (for whom poverty is a condition of
eligibility) and for many, if not most. Social Security recipients who
are by definition elderly or disabled (or their dependents or survivors).
In recognition of the fact that overpayments are often not the fault of
the recipient, and that repayment can cause great hardship if the
money has been spent. Congress has mandated that the Social Secur
ity Administration must waive collection of overpayments from any
recipient who is without fault and if "adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes" of the Act or "would be against equity and good
conscience."
In general, therefore, waiver is appropriate if the overpayment
was not the recipient's fault (note that this is quite a strict standard—
it is not enough that the recipient did nothing to cause the overpay
ment; the recipient must also be unaware that the payments are in the
wrong amount) and, in addition, if recovery of the overpayment
would cause financial hardship.
With few exceptions, as a practical matter, the only individuals
who ever meet the test for waivers are poor. In 1979, the Supreme
Court (recognizing the importance of the waiver provisions) read into
the statute a requirement for a prior oral hearing before a requested
waiver was denied.'® In 1989, the Court considered a challenge to the
validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary to defeat the stat
utory waiver provisions when a recipient had received both underpay
ments and overpayments." Instead of (as in the past) considering the
overpayments separately to determine if waiver applied, the overpay
ment and underpayment are calculated together ("netted") and the
recipient has no opportunity to seek waiver of any part of the over
payment netted against the underpayment.^"
Justice Scalia, writing for a divided five-to-four Court, found no
problem with this regulatory scheme. His approach is profoundly dis
couraging to advocates for the poor.
First, he neutralizes the issue by ignoring the human dimensions
of the problems faced by plaintiffs who live in a real world of poverty,
illness and overdue bills. He illustrates the problem raised by the case
in terms of a "hypothetical" couple, coolly called Mr. A and Mrs. B,
17
1®
19
20

42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1988).
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 687 (1979).
Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.504, 416.538 (1990).
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each of whom has underpayments and overpayments amounting to
under $50. In contrast, Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion,
chooses the real life example of the plaintiff Emil Zwiezen and his
wife, who lost thousands of dollars in benefits because of the netting
rule and as a result "could not pay his water bills, had fallen behind in
his house payments, and feared that his doctor and druggist would
stop providing him medical care."^'
Justice Scalia's next step is to look at the "plain" language of the
statute, and of course (as will almost always be possible) there is a
way to read the words to permit the result reached. As Justice Felix
Frankfurter has pointed out, "[t]he notion that because the words of a
statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious
oversimplification."^^
Reaching this result requires ignoring the intent of Congress, as
reflected in the mandatory language of the waiver statute. Because
waiver is guaranteed for "any" adjustment or recovery Justice Scaha
writes that the agency is not engaged in adjustment or recovery when
it nets an underpayment against an overpayment, but is simply calcu
lating whether more or less than the correct amount of payment has
been made. Only after that calculation is made, in Justice Scalia's
view, does the Secretary decide whether any remaining overpayment
should be waived.
The next step is to determine if the result accords with the stat
ute, but here, as in Lukhard v. Reed, the test is a negative one—not is
it the result most consistent with the statutory scheme, but is it an
"absurd" result? Justice Scalia's answer is that it is not absurd, be
cause it is not as much of a hardship not to receive a payment due
(when an underpayment is reduced by a past overpayment) as it is to
have to pay over cash, so the waiver provisions need only apply to the
latter. But if the only test a regulation need meet is that it does not
produce an "absurd" result, any challenge to a regulation does not
stand much chance.
II.

Is THERE ANYTHING TO BE HAPPY ABOUT?

It is sometimes suggested that Justice Scalia's narrow view of the
role of the Court may, in the end, be a good thing given the Court's
current composition. Regrettably, however, there are some signs that
when private property interests are threatened, deference to the legis21 Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Kennedy).
22 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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lature becomes less important, and Justice Scalia may be willing to see
the Court take an activist role.
In Pennell v. San Jose,^^ Justice Scalia dissented from a decision
upholding a California rent control regulation, which included a pro
vision permitting a hearing officer to consider the tenant's financial
hardship in determining if the regulated rent was excessive. The land
lords tiad argued that this provision constituted an unconstitutional
taking of private property without compensation. The majority said
that the issue was premature because there was no record that the
hardship provision had ever been applied.
Justice Scalia, who in other contexts has been quick to urge the
Court not to reach out to decide cases unnecessarily,^'^ here argues
vehemently that the lack of any showing that the hardship regulation
has been apphed is "no reason thus to shield alleged constitutional
injustice from judicial scrutiny."^' Is this the same justice who in
Webster v. Doe"^ dismissed the notion that all constitutional viola
tions must be remediable in Court? And what about the fact that the
provision at issue was enacted as part of the normal legislative pro
cess, so respected by Justice Scalia in other contexts? In his dissent.
Justice Scalia reasons that the rent control ordinance redistributes
wealth in a way hidden from public scrutiny, rather than by the "nor
mal democratic processes."^' This case is not a good sign about
where we will find Justice Scalia if the government ever moves toward
greater eflforts to redistribute wealth.^®
III.

Is THERE ANY HOPE?

There is always hope, but hope is not always reasonable. It is a
sad but safe prediction that public assistance recipients challenging
unfair public assistance programs will seldom persuade Justice Scalia,
given his narrow view of the role of the courts.
During his confirmation hearing, Justice Scalia spoke engagingly
of the beauty of the American system of checks and balances:
23 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
24 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
school suspension case should be dismissed as moot because the individual plaintiff had not
demonstrated that it was "probable" that the problem would recur).
25 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
26 486 U.S. 592, 606 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
22 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
28 I wonder if Justice Scalia particularly disapproves of rent controls. In his contribution
to a Federalist Society symposium on federalism, then-Professor Scalia urged conservatives to
consider federal legislation to mandate market freedom, and asked (rhetorically?) why no one
has considered a federal law banning rent control. Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1982).
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[I]f you had to put your finger on what has made our Constitution
so enduring, I think it is the original document before the amend
ments were added.
Because the amendments [the Bill of Rights], by themselves,
do not do anything. The Russian constitution probably has better,
or at least as good guarantees of personal freedom as our document
does. What makes it work, what assures that those words are not
just hollow promises, is the structure of government that the origi
nal Constitution established, the checks and balances among the
three branches, in particular, so that no one of them is able to "run
roughshod" over the liberties of the people as those liberties are
described in the Bill of Rights.^'

Justice Scalia has an extremely optimistic (although perhaps in
sincere) view of the legislature's capacity to correct injustice, restrict
ing the Court's role to "making it inescapably clear to Congress what
changes need to be made."^°
The problems of access to the democratic process do not much
trouble Justice Scalia. In Community Nutrition Institute v. Block,
then-Judge Scalia dissented from a decision granting standing to indi
viduals challenging United States Department of Agriculture milk
regulations that raised prices.
Justice Scalia observed,
"[gjovemmental mischief whose effects are widely distributed is more
readily remedied through the political process, and does not call into
play the distinctive function of the courts as guardians against oppres
sion of the few by the many."^^ The difficulty of mobilizing a large
political constituency when the issue is raising milk prices only a few
cents for each consumer is not addressed in the opinion.
But even when the "distinctive function of the courts as guardi
ans against oppression of the few by the many" is called into play
Justice Scalia still doesn't see a role for the courts. In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,Justice Scalia's
majority opinion held that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits
to individuals fired for using a drug prohibited by state law during
religious ritual.^'* His opinion states: "Values that are protected
against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process" and there29 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, 1986: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1986) [hereinafter .ffear/ngi] (testimony of Antonin Scalia).
20 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471, 481-82 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
31 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
32 Id. at 1256.
33 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
34 Id. at 1606.
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fore, it is up to the Oregon state legislature to make exception to their
drug laws for sacramental peyote use.^' Justice Scalia's opinion goes
on to recognize that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely en
gaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each con
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weight the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.

But as Justice O'Connor aptly points out in her sharp concurrence,
"the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and
may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doc
trine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had
on unpopular or emerging religious groups."^'
Other aspects of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence are also not en
couraging for the poor hoping that the good society will include them.
Justice Scalia hates balancing tests. But the poor often fare very well
on balancing tests because their needs are so urgent.^® His opinion in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith il
lustrates his willingness to jettison years of "painstakingly"^ devel
oped standards to avoid requiring the Court to apply a traditional
balancing approach. Justice Scalia describes as "horrible" the con
templation of federal judges being "constantly in the business" of
weighing claims for religious exemption from generally applicable
laws.'^' Justice O'Connor describes the process more simply, stating
that it is "our role as judges to decide each case on its individual
merits.'"*^
Another aspect of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence that is troubling
for the poor is his love of clean, bright lines and rules that are strictly
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (individual's overpowering need
not to be deprived of basic assistance outweighs justified desire to protect public funds).
39 Employment Division, 110 S. Ct. at 1595.
40 /d. at 1615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4t Id. at 1606 n.5. For other examples of Justice Scalia's hostility to balancing tests, see
Rutan V. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746-57 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should overrule cases permitting balancing test for determining whether party
membership may be required for government job) and Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enters.,
486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (urging abandonment of balanc
ing approach in negative commerce clause cases).
42 110 S. Ct. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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enforced, regardless of the circumstances. His dissent in Houston v.
Lack*^ is a disturbing example of this approach. In that case, the
issue was whether a prisoner's pro se notice of appeal was timely filed.
Because the prisoner lacked funds, prison authorities had refused his
requests to certify the notice for mailing on the day in question and to
send it air mail. The notice was received late, and the question was
whether the otherwise meritorious appeal should be dismissed.
The majority held that the notice was timely because the prisoner
had timely delivered it to prison officials.^ (Perhaps trying for Justice
Scalia's vote, the majority opinion urged that their approach was
bright line because it would recognize the moment of receipt by
prison authorities as the moment of filing.)'^^ In contrast. Justice
Scalia's dissent argues that the rule adopted by the majority should be
rejected even though it "makes sense," for Congress, not the courts,
should enact such a rule. Justice Scalia specifically rejects the bright
line argument, noting that once equitable considerations are applied,
other circumstances will be urged as excusing compliance with the
rules. "Thus is wasteful litigation in our appellate courts multi
plied.'"^ Justice Scalia may be correct in arguing that too many
bright lines defeat the purpose of a rule. However, it hardly seems
"wasteful" for the courts to decide issues as important as whether
individuals should be denied access to appellate remedies based on
technical defaults that are not their fault.
IV.

Is THERE A GLIMMER OF HOPE?

During his confirmation hearings. Justice Scalia said, "courts
should be, obviously, as concerned about massive societal problems,
such as the problem of discrimination in this country as either of the
other two branches of government.'"^' Is there any chance that his
concern will be translated into action?
I have been interested to note that in Justice Scalia's decisions on
social welfare issues, he frequently mentions (albeit in passing) policy
issues, as if to say, that while they do not really matter to his result,
the result is not as harsh as it seems. In his dissent in Pennell v. San
Jose, the California rent control case. Justice Scalia observes that the
"hardship" exceptions for rent increases are available to individuals
«
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making up to $32,400 a year.'^® Of course, it is irrelevant to the due
process-taking analysis that the municipality is extremely generous, or
even overly generous, in defining hardship. Does mentioning that
some of the rent control tenants are relatively well off reflect some
sensitivity to the problems of the poor? If so, it is a very limited sensi
tivity, and one that does not bear close analysis. It is not just the
unworthy tenant making $32,400 who loses a benefit if the rent con
trol ordinance is invalid; obviously the worthy tenant making $3,000
is also hurt, and even more so.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Everhart, the Social Security netting
case. Justice Scalia mentions that having an underpayment reduced
by a past overpayment will not hurt a Social Security recipient as
much as a reduction in current benefits.^' And he justifies his crabbed
interpretation of Social Security waiver and netting rules by noting
that the "expenses" of the Social Security recipients proposal "in the
end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available
for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited."'® Ad
vocates for the poor should be forgiven a certain skepticism about
whether the money saved by denying due process to some poor per
sons will be redistributed among the poor. But does Justice Scalia's
remark show some rudimentary sensitivity to the needs of recipients,
or some guilt about the result? Or is this just a kind of in terrorem
clause of the opinion, warning recipients that if they keep asking for
more, they may end up with less?
Maybe there is a basis for hope after all. This past term. Justice
Scalia joined the majority in Sullivan v. Zebley,^^ invalidating Social
Security regulations denying Supplemental Security Income disability
benefits to disabled children whose impairment is not mentioned on
the "hst" of impairments contained in the regulations. Given his ju
risprudence, he should have come out the opposite way. As in Ever
hart, the statute could be read to justify the Secretary's regulation
(and several other courts had so read it)." There is the principle of
deference to the agency's interpretation. There is a regulatory scheme
with the clearest and cleanest of bright lines—^if the child's impair
ment is on the list, the child gets benefits; if not, benefits are denied.
There is the certainty that if the Secretary's regulatory scheme is re
jected in favor of a more individualized approach to children's disabil48 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988).
49 110 S. Ct. 960, 966 (1990).
so Id. at 967 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)).
51 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
52 Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 742 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.
1984); Powell ex rel. Powell v. Schwecker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982).

1830

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1817

ity, the courts will be busy—as with the adult disability program—
reviewing the Secretary's determinations. But despite all that, there is
Justice Scalia with the majority invalidating the regulation.
We can only guess at Justice Scalia's reasoning. Unfortunately
for those trying to understand Justice Scalia, but fortunately for the
children, the opinion was written by Justice Blackmun. Possibly Jus
tice Scalia was not unmoved by the reality of thousands of indigent
severely disabled children (and their families, struggling to care for
them at home) deprived of benefits. Indeed only the most hard
hearted Justice (Justice White) or the most heartless (Justice Rehnquist) was unaffected and dissented.
There may be a lesson here for advocates. Perhaps in our pessi
mism and wish to be taken seriously as calm, analytical lawyers rather
than wild-eyed (or teary-eyed, for some) lunatics with law degrees, we
have not been working hard enough to demonstrate to the courts the
extreme misery of our clients' lives. Still, Zebley is more likely an
aberration than a straw in the wind.
CONCLUSION

It is not enough in a "good society" for the poor to be free to
bum the flag to protest their hunger, homelessness and oppression.'^
In a good society of our wealth, no one should be without adequate
food, clothing, or shelter. And the courts should be open to their
claims, as to the claims of others who are oppressed by the majority.
Lawyers and courts have a role in attaining the good society and, even
if it is a long way off, perhaps we can make some things better for the
poor as we struggle toward this goal. If we succeed, I fear it will be
despite and not because of Mr. Justice Scalia.
'3 And the poor had better stick to flag burning in Scalia's good society. Sleeping in a
public park, as a means of protesting the plight of the homeless, may be forbidden. See Com
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissent
ing, with whom ScaUa, J., concurs).

